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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STEAVEN R.. HESTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs., 
Case No. 18220 
SOUTH OGDEN CITY and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a workmen's compensation case involving an 
employee of South Ogden City. 
DISPOSITION BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order which granted benefits to the 
applicant for a knee injury that he allegedly suffered on June 5th, 
1978, but denied any benefits related to a hip injury that plaintiff 
alleged occured more than a year later as a result of the original 
industrial accident. A Motion for Review of the Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge as to the denial of benefits for the hip 
was timely filed, which motion was denied by the Industrial Commission 
on December 24, 1981. The Industrial Commission affirmed the 
order of the Administrative Law Judge in pertinent part. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
It is respectfully submitted that the Order, as affirmed 
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by the Industrial Commission, should be upheld by the Supreme 
Court. 
FACTS 
While defendant does not specifically disagree with 
plaintiff's factual statement, the statement contains only those 
facts that the plaintiff wishes to present in support of his appeal. 
Therefore, it is necessary that certain facts be supplied that 
require emphasis which is not given in plaintiff's brief. 
On June 5, 1978 while in the course of his employment, 
with defendant South Ogden City, plaintiff was injured in an 
industrial accident. Then the garbage truck on which he was working 
made contact with his left knee causing a hyperextension injury. 
(R. 1,3,4,14) His primary medical care was undertaken by Dr. 
Fred F. Brewer, who diagnosed a pre-patella bursitis septic. 
(R.3) Because of continuing complaints and difficulties, Doctor 
Brewer performed surgeries on the left knee on July 18, 1978 
(R. 3, 15), October 17, 1978, (R. 5, 16) and March 5, 1979. 
Following the third surgery on the knee, his treating 
physician felt that his condition was significantly improving and 
in fact, found that the left knee condition had stabilized no later 
than in August of 1979. (R. 46, 87, 95, 232, 286-287, 289,) 
The first complaint of any hip problems or difficulties 
occured in an office visit with Doctor Brewer by plaintiff on 
June 7, 1979. (R. 33, 221, 287, 303) That complaint was one 
year and 2 days following the alleged industrial event. 
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It should be noted that the Statement of Facts as it 
follows from here is intended to give those facts which support 
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. It is acknowledged that the opinion of the 
treating physician, Dr. Brewer, is that there is an indirect 
connection between the knee injury and the hip difficulties of the 
plaintiff due to gait changes resulting from his favoring his left 
leg. (Ro 285) Two surger1es have in fact been performed on the 
left hip condition: 1 .. September 4, 1979 (R. 16, 46) and 
2. On March 24, 1981. (R. 290). 
Doctor Brewer has made the following comments during the 
course and progress of plaintiff's hip problem: 
1. September 3, 1979 - " .••• At the hip, the range of 
motion is normal, but there is considerable pain 
with the rotation articularly. I can elicit 
no definite snapping sensation but the tenderness 
is well-localized to greater trochanter." (R. 188) 
2. September 4, 1979 - Operative report - " ..... 
Trochanteric Bursa. was visualized and most of 
the bursa! tissue removed for diagnostic purposes. 
The bursa did not appear grossly abnormal ... " 
(R. 194, 303) 
3.. From Hearing transcript - " 
Q. (by Mr. Black) Doctor, let me go on to the 
snapping hip problem. That sort of problem 
you see fairly often in your practice, is 
that correct? 
A. It's not a rarity. It's not a common occurance 
either. 
Q. Sometimes that occurs with or without trauma, 
is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
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Sometimes it just occurs on a developmental 
basis without having any other physiological 
problem, isn't that correct? 
There are occasions when I have no reasonable 
explaination why it occured." (R. 52) 
St. Benedict's Hospital records, by Doctor Brew~ 
dated 3-23-82 - " .... In recent months, he has 
redeveloped pain about the hip and would still 
appear to be disabled, although this is difficult 
to evaluate at (sic) this patient is certainly not 
particularly intelligent and and (sic) as well, 
appears to be interested in continuing disability 
and remuneration for the same. 
A number of objective studies have been conducted including 
X-rays and EMGs, all of which report no abnormal findings. (R. 189, 
207, 209,) 
The plaintiff was referred for consultation and treatment 
to Doctor John M. Bender in the latter part of 1979. Doctor Bender 
has stated the following: 
1. April 14, 1980 - " Steaven has no definate 
neurologic loss in left lower extremity or 
elsewhere. Electromyography performed 12-12-79 
is normal. Though he describes numbness, there 
are no objective signs of sensory or motor loss 
or reflex abnormalities". 
(R. 183) 
Following the initial evQdentiary hearing of October 2, 
1980, the applicant was referred to a Medical Panel comprised of 
Dr. Charles M. Swindler, an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Richard 
S. Iverson, a neuro-psychiatrist. Doctor Swindler was the panel 
chairman and in conjunction with Doctor Iverson, prepared a 
report of his examination dated December 30, 1980. In pertinent 
part the report stated the following concerning their examination: 
" .... On physical examination we are confronted with 
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a healthy appearing young white male, who on gross 
inspection in the office, walked with a profound 
cog-wheel type of limp in the entire left lower 
extremity. He walked as if he had a totally stiff 
knee and furthermore, in the erect walking attitude 
he listed his entire vertebral column markedly to 
the left and somewhat forwarde At the time of the 
initial examination, the man was wearing western boots. 
During the process of disrobing for the e~amination, 
he appeared to have great difficulty removing the boot 
on the left lower extremity - presumably this was due 
to the supposed stiff left kneeo On the other hand, 
when it came time to remove his jeans, he very actively 
flexed his left hip and his left knee to their full 
range of flexion. When asked to sit on the examining 
table, he maintained his knee in an extended attitude 
and furthermore he maintained his left foot in some 
varus and adduction. When standing the man complained 
of intense pain in the left leg to a point where he 
would not bear full weight on the left lower extremity, 
even in the standing attitude. However, when asked to 
walk across the room with the arms extended and the 
eyes shut he would bear weight evenly on both lower 
extremities and in point of fact, at one point he 
stumbled slightly, thereby upsetting his sense of 
erect balance but from the objective point of view, he 
recovered his balance quickly and with great alacrity 
as far as the l·eft extremity is concerned. As far as 
ambulation is concerned the patient had a very normal 
heel gait but he stated that the hip pain "tore him up" 
so that he could not perform a toe gait. Additionally 
the patient was unable to perform a tandum gait because 
he stated that his "left hip was too weak". 
In the standing erect attitude, the man was noted 
to have full range of motion of the entire vertebral 
column in all planes. There was noted, as far as the 
low back examination is concerned, no muscle spasm; 
there was no guarding; there was no local tenderness, 
either superficial or deep in character. Indeed, the 
man was able to flex forward and bring the finger tips 
to the floor. He could get on and off the examining 
table without any apparent difficulty; on the other hand, 
when asked to turn and twist on the examining table he 
complained bitterly of pain and stiffness in his left 
hip. Again he would state that "my hip is corning out 
of the joint and is becoming unraveled." 
In the supine attitude on the examining table, the 
right lower extremity as well as the low back appeared to 
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be normal in all respects. Passively, as far as motion 
in the left hip was concerned here, by means of confusion, 
there was noted full synunetrical motion in all planes as 
compared with the op2osite extremity. The patient 
violently resisted the passive manipulation of the straight 
leg raising sign and when asked to voluntarily perform 
the flexion of the left hip in the supine position he 
presented a typical cog-wheel type of· rigidity. 
In the sitting attitude on the examining table, 
the man was found to have both actively and passivel 
full flexion of the affected left hip. Indeed, he could 
in the sitting attitude, flex forward and bring the 
chin to the knees without apparent difficulty 
Examination of the left knee both in the supine 
attitude and in the sitting was quite inconsistent. At 
one point the man would contend that he was unable to 
either extend his left knee to his maximum physiologic 
range or to flex the left knee and yet, with manuvers of 
distraction during the physical examination, the left 
knee was noted to flex very freely to 45 degrees and to 
extend to 180 degrees. The sciatic stretch sign 
bilaterally .was negative. Muscle power evaluation in 
both feet was normal and all muscle component levels. 
Knee jerk and ankle jerk reflexes were brisk and equal 
bilaterally. 
There was only a questionable suggestion of uniform 
atrophy of the left lower extremity - this is in spite 
of the fact that the patient stated that he was unable 
to use this limb for the past several months .... 
Assuming but not deciding that the applicant was 
involved in the events as alleged, we find the following 
information to be germaine to the problem presented to 
us: 
I. Are the applicant's medical problems of the left 
hip attributed to the left knee injury of June 5, 
1978? 
The problems of the left hip are not 
attributable or related to the left knee 
injury. This observation is based on the 
medical history; the clinical findings; the 
results of the x-ray examination and the 
specific lack of demonstrable organic 
pathology to confirm a casual relationship. 
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IIo What is the applicant's total permanent disability 
rating based upon the combined left knee and left 
hip injuries? 
We do not find objective evidence of an 
increment of total permanent disability 
as it would be related to the left knee and 
the left hip. This observation is based 
on the lack of demonstrable pathology, i.e. 
no radiographic evidence of injury; no 
clinical findings of diminished range of 
motion of the respective joints in question; 
no clinical sign of atrophy or muscle power 
loss and/or gross skeletal deformity 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
VI. What is the overall percentage of permanent 
disability of this applicant including both 
physical and psychologic factors? 
There is no permanent disability factor 
involved as we see this patient. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
XII. Absent any pre-existing condition, what effect, 
if any, would the accident have had regarding 
his psychiatric impairment? 
Clinical examination and evaluation of 
this patient's mental status by this 
board, particularly the neuro-psychiatric 
member failed to demonstrate any true 
presently existing psychiatric disease. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
xv. Which, if any, of Mr. Hester's present complaints 
are causally related to the industrial injury 
and which, if any, are unrelated and to what 
extent does each category contribute to his 
present impairment? 
The subjective complaints, as they refer 
to the left thigh and the left hip are, 
in the opinion of the panel, unrelated to 
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the industrial accident in question but on 
the other hand as of this examination 
appear to be the major cause of the patient' 
present alleged impairment. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
XVII. What is the percentage of permanent physical 
impairment if any, attributable to the industrial 
injury of June 5, 1978? 
The medical panel is unable to demonstrate 
any impairment of physical function of the 
musculo-skeletal system attributable to the 
industrial injury on June 5, 1978. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
XX. What medical treatments, if any, including 
medication, will be reasonably required in 
treating Mr. Hester as a result of the industrial 
injury of June 5, 1978 in the foreseeable future? 
As a result of this examination the medical 
panel feels that maximum medical benefit 
has been obtained and that no further 
specific treatment including medication is 
indicated. Certainly, there is no 
indication for any corrective surgery. 
There is no indication for the use of a 
physical appliance, such as a brace. There 
is no demonstrable evidence of a neuro-
psychiatric disease and therefore, there 
is no indication for any specific neuro-
psychiatric medication. Physical therapy 
and muscle re-education exercises have 
in the past been outlined by competent 
physicians and these modalities of management 
the patient refused to accept. Physical 
therapy, now, is no clinically indicated. 
(R. 244-250) (Emphasis Added) 
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After submission of the above findings by the Medical 
Panel to the parties, the plaintiff in a timely fashion objected 
to those findings on January 28, 19810 (R. 254) At the time of 
the hearing on June 12, 1981, on the plaintiff's objections, Dr.· 
Charles Mo Swindler, panel Chairman, appeared in support of the 
medical panel report (R. 258). Following the laying of the 
foundation for the admission of the Medical Panel Report, the 
Administrative Law Judge admitted the report subject to the 
cross-examination of counsel for plaintiff. (R. 264) Doctor 
Swindler confirmed that the panel could find no permanent impairment 
that they could relate to the industrial injury. (R. 264) Doctor 
Swindler also affirmed that it was highly speculative that the 
hip problems were related to non-use of the hip as a result of the 
knee. (R. 268-269, 277) 
Following Doctor Swindler's testimony the treating 
physician was called by the plaintiff and testified in 
support of his opinion that the hip problem was indeed caused 
indirectly by the gait and abnormal use of the left leg over a 
period of time. He further assigned specific percentages of 
impairment to both the knee and hip. (R. 278-314) 
At the conclusion of Doctor Brewer's testimony, Doctor 
Swindler was recalled as a witness. He was asked if any of the 
testimony he had heard or any additional records that he may have 
examined had changed his opinion as to the causal relationship of 
the hip problems to the industrial accident. His reply was that 
nothing that had taken place had changed the opinions expressed in 
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Based upon the above evidence the Administrative Law 
Judge entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
on October 29, 19810 The specific findings of fact in support of 
the Administrative Law Judge's decision to deny benefits for the 
left hip difficulties, were very specific and are as follows: 
"The applicant was referred to a Medical Panel for an 
examination and report. The panel report is hereby 
incorporated by reference. The panel found that as a 
result of the accident of June 5, 1978, that the 
applicant had suffered no permanent physical impairment 
to said left knee and that there is no causal relation-
ship between the accident of June 5, 1978, and the 
hip surgery of September 1979 •.•• 
The Administrative Law Judge further finds that the 
applicant is not entitled to permanent physical disability 
compensation for either of the hip operations nor is he I' 
entitled to temporary total disability compensation for the 1 
periods that he was recouperating due to the hip surgery. 
(R. 357) II. 
Consistent with the above Findings of Fact, the Administrativl 
Law Judge denied benefits for the left hip difficulties. (R. 357-358) 
Thereafter, the plaintiff timely· filed a Motion for Review 
of the Administrative Law Judge's Order (R. 367) accompanied by a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R. 360-366). On December 28, 
1981 the Industrial Commission after performing it's statutorily 
required review of the entire record affirmed the Administrative 
Law Judge's decision. (R. 369-370). 
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THE SUPREME COURT IS PRECLUDED FROM WEIGHING EVIDENCE 
AND/OR REVIEWING FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
§37-1-85, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states in part: 
The findings and conclusions of the commission 
on questions of fact shall be conclusive and final 
and shall not be subject to review; such questions 
of fact shall include ultimate facts and the 
findings and conclusions of the commission. 
As can be seen from the foregoing, the Supreme Court is 
without authority to disturb factual conclusions of the Industrial 
Commission. 
The issue of weighing conflicting evidence is left 
with the Industrial Commission. Russell v. Industrial Commission, 
43 P2d 1069, (1953) states in part, at 1072 and 1073: 
By express statutory provisions and by a long 
line of decisions of this court we are precluded 
from weighing conflicting evidence and making findings 
of fact. That is the providence of the commission. 
The duties of this court are limited to a determination 
of questions of law. We may interfere with the 
commission's findings of fact in those cases where an 
award is granted without support of competent evidence, 
and likewise, where an award is denied against uncon-
tradicted evidence without any reasonable basis for 
disbelieving the same. In such cases a question of law 
is presented for determination; otherwise, the findings 
of the commission must be affirmed. . . 
When any one of two or more inferences may 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence, this court 
is not authorized to direct which inference must be 
drawn, and, likewise, when, as in the instant case, 
it is somewhat of a speculation as to where or how 
the deceased recieved the injury complained of, this 
court is precluded from directing an award. 
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Case law has continually sustained this position taken 
by the Court and the legislature. See Wilson et al v. Industrial 
Commission, 108 p2d 519, (1940); Jones v. Ogden Auto Body, Sup Ct 
No. 17853 (Utah April 24, 1982); Clinger v. Industrial Commission, 
571 p2d 1328 (Utah 1977); Savage v. Industrial Commission, 565 p2d 
782 (Utah 1977). 
A cursory examination of the facts in the instant case 
reveals conflict between two qualified experts. The plaintiff 
contends that because Oro Swindler deferred to the treating 
physician actual periods of temporary total disability, that he 
likewise deferred the primary issue of the causal relationship of 
the hip problems to the industrial accident. (Plaintiff's brief 
pp. 6-9). That simply is not the case. Dr. Swindler clearly 
stated his opinion that the hip problems were totally unrelated. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS NOT COMPELLED TO ACCEPT 
THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S TREATING PHYSICIAN 
As stated above, the Industrial Commission must be 
sustained unless it acted arbitrarily. The evidence indicates, 
however, that substantial conflict existed between Plaintiff's 
position and other substantive evidence before the Commission. 
As a result, Plaintiff seems to argue that the Commission must 
accept his testimony and evidence. 
Kent v. Industrial Corrunission, 57 P2d 725, (1936), 
while factually different from the case at bar, contains the 
following language: 
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Recently, in the case of Gagos v. Industrial 
Commission, supra, this court held, referring to 
the Industrial Commission, that: "The fact finder 
is not always required to believe the uncontradicted 
evidence of a witness," because there may be infirmities, 
not revealed by the record which caused the evidence 
to fail to carry conviction of its truth to the 
Commission, and that under such circumstances the 
commission was not required to find in accordance 
with such evidence. 
It is important to note that the Commission may 
disregard even uncontroverted evidence of a witness. This goes 
further than the case at bar since the evidence of Plaintiff 
is, certainly, not "uncontradicted"o 
Lorange v. Industrial Commission, 153 P2d 272, 273, 
(1944), states: 
We cannot say from our review of the whole 
record that the Commission is bound to accept the 
testimony of plaintiff as to the cause of his eye injury 
to the exclusion of all the other testimony and record 
evidence. The testimony in the case is in conflict, it 
involves discrepancies, ... but the fact remains that 
in the ultimate the evidence does not require a contrary 
finding. We are also unable to say that the Commission's 
decision is the result of capricious or arbitrary action, 
which we would be required to determine before setting 
its order aside. It was said by Mr. Justice Frick in 
Kavalinakis v. Ind. Comm., 67 Utah 174, 246 p. 698: 
"Unless therefore it can be said, upon the whole record, 
that the commission clearly acted arbitrarily or ca-
priciously in making its findings and decision, this 
court is powerless to interfere. Such is the manifest 
purpose and intent of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
where it has been made reasonably clear that the 
commission had misconstrued or misapplied the provisions 
of the act, this court has never hesitated to point out 
the error and to correct the same. It was not intended, 
however, that this court, in matters of evidence, should 
to any extent substitute its judgment for the judgment 
of the commission." (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's position here is similar to that taken by 
plaintiff in Vause v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d. 217, 
40J; ... pza IUOb, 
/ 
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his own testimony and evidence adduced on his behalf." The 
court said there: 
The weakness in Plaintiff's position is one 
not uncommon in appeals to this court: of becoming 
so absorbed in his own contentions and so preoccupied 
with the assumed righteousness of his own case that 
he is unable or unwilling to give proper consideration 
to the countervailing evidence. 
. . . Our statutory and decisionaly law require 
us to look at the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Commission's finding, and it is the obligation 
of the parties involved to so present the matter to 
the court. 
This court cannot properly reverse the 
Commission and compel an award unless there_ is 
credible evidence without substantial contradiction 
which points so clearly and persuasively in plaintiff's 
favor that failure to so find would justify the 
conclusion that the Commission acted capriciously, 
arbitrarily or unreasonably in disregarding or refusing 
to believe the evidence. (Emphasis added) 
At this juncture, one should refer to the case of 
Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 431 P2d 798, 
(1967). There an award was denied plaintiff, who suffered a 
heart problem which "could have occurred while the man was 
asleep or otherwise, on or off the job". The court cites, 
approvingly, language from another case, Purity Biscuit Co., v. 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 2d 1, 201 P2d 961, (1949), which 
follows in part: 
In this type of case we are dealing with 
3itu.u.ticu.3 ·iu.·v·clving death or disability which 
situations may, due to a functional failure, occur 
by reason of the work or may be purely coincidental 
with it. Where the death or disability occurs under 
such circumstances as to present prima f acie doubt 
as whether it was caused by exertion incidental to 
the work, or an event which occurred only in the 
duration of the work and in regard to which the 
work furnished no material or efficient concurring 
or cooper a ting cause, then, bef 91}@· a favG£•alr.•,. ,_, 
I 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 15 -
award is made, it should appear by clear and 
convincing evidence that the exertion in pursuance 
of the work was at least an efficient cooperating 
cause of the disability or death. The commission 
should bave clear and convincing proof that the 
exertion done as a part of the work, whether 
ordinary or extraordinary, was a factor which 
materially contributed to or caused the death or 
disability. Unless the commission requires clear 
and convincing proof that the disability was 
employment connected, that is, materially 
contributed to by the work performed, we may open 
wide the door to compensating nonemployment 
connected death or disabilites which the act 
was not intended to cover. This rule I suppose 
is primarily one of guidance for the commission. 
It would seem that unless no reasonable mind 
could say that the evidence was clear and 
convincing, the commission could not be over-
turned for arbitrariness. (Emphasis added). 
Given this standard of proof, the Plaintiff did not sustain 
his burden in this case. The remainder of Mellen contains language 
which is highly informative as to the case at bar. It is, however, 
repetitive and will not be cited for that reason, except as to the 
following: 
The fallacy which underlies plaintiff's 
attack on the Commission's finding is that they 
improperly attempt to focus consideration o'fthe 
issues exclusively upon their own view of the 
evidence and theories of the case. While some 
aspects of the statistical data and medical 
theories harmonize with their contention, others 
fail to do so . . . (Emphasis added) . 
It is respectfully submitted that the same "fallacy" 
underlies the case presently at bare 
As further support for the above contention, it should 
be emphasized that the Commission is not bound by the opinions of 
expert witnesses: 
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"We have no disagreement with the plaintiff's 
argument that it would be unjust and impermissible for 
the Commission to obdurately ignore clear, credible 
and uncontradicted evidence so that its action is 
arbitrary and unreasonablee Yet {sic) is not necessarily 
bound to accept the opinions of any witness or 
witnesses, expert or otherwise as to what its 
determination should be. If it were so, it should be 
obvious that this would t.urn the prerogative entirely 
over to the expert witness and would relieve the 
Commission of both its prerogative and its responsibilityo 
This would be especially true in a case like this 
where it would seem that the question as to the 
degree of plaintiff's disability, both as to the 
percentage and the permanency thereof, and how it 
compares to specific disabilities listed in the 
statute, is-not a problem in mathematics which can be 
determined with absolute certainty, but involves the 
exercise of some judgment upon which reasonable 
minds might vary in their conclusions. 
To be considered in connection with the foregoing 
is the fact that the burden rested upon the plaintiff 
to prove the extent of his disability by evidence which 
persuades the Commission in accordance with his contention. 
In that connection it is to be had in mind that there 
was not only the evidence upon which the plaintiff 
relies concerning his unemployability, but also 
the evidence, which he seems to ignore, of the medical 
panel which rated his disability at 50 percent, which 
the Commission elected to believe and adopt as its 
finding. It is not open to question that if the 
Commission had chosen to make its findings in 
accordance with the plaintiff's evidence, that award 
would be sustained. But upon this review it is our 
duty to survey the total evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commission's determination: and to 
assume that it believed those aspects of the evidence 
which support its award; and we cannot properly reverse 
when there is a reasonable basis therein to support 
the findings and award as made. Shipley v. C & W 
Contracting Company, 528 P2d 153 {Utah 1974) {Emphasis 
added) . 
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CONCLUSION 
As can be seen from the foregoing facts and argument, 
substantive facts exist to justify the findings reached by the 
Industrial Commission in this case. The Commission did not act 
~ 
arbitrarily or capricously. The Commission simply chose to accept 
the opinion of one expert over the opinion of the treating 
physician. It is respectfully submitted that the Court should 
sustain the Industrial Commission's Order. 
DATED THIS .;2.f2_.Day_of July, 1982. 
BLACK & MOORE 
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